1. The
Expansion of Legal Aid
1.1 In the 1970s and 80s
there was a large expansion of Legal Aid which was at that time essentially an
adjunct to the other work of solicitors firms, there being some 7000 suppliers,
Legal Aid work sitting alongside normal commercial work like conveyancing,
probate and contract.
1.2 Administered by the Law
Society the hourly rates were not as high as those prevailing in the private
client and commercial world but nevertheless were related to the cost of time.
1.3 The cost of time was
calculated by assigning a target for chargeable hours for each fee earner, usually
1200 hours per annum, a notional salary for solicitors and partners and
dividing overheads by the numbers of fee earners to find out applicable hourly
rates.
1.4 Provision was made for
lower hourly rates for travel and waiting, a problem that has always been
apparent in legal aid work which is often not office based but court based, and
in the case of crime, prison and police station based, with the consequence
that large parts of chargeable hours were consumed in lower paid hourly rates. Fixed
fee schemes containing ‘rolled up’ time spent travelling and waiting ‘hide’ the
true costs of cases within their simplicity.
1.5 However, in terms of
cost benefit it is also to be noted that the organisation of courts and the
interaction of advocates and the tribunal and particularly the flow of work
provided by ushers in Magistrates Courts is highly efficient; face to face
interactions provide courts with good quality information upon which to base
decisions.
2. A Changing Supplier Base
2.1 As Legal Aid expanded
the Law Society administration was unable to cope. Delay in payment became a
well-known public fact and eventually the decision was made to move the
administration of Legal Aid away from the Law Society into the hands of an
independent Legal Aid Board. This was at inception essentially a cashier
organisation but it also had within it a desire to promote and implement
policy.
2.2 What had also happened
is that a number of more specialist Legal Aid suppliers had come into being
whose main purpose was to provide Legal Aid services in the community, usually
both civil and crime covering the full range of civil, family law, welfare
benefits, housing, mental health and immigration. In essence a numerous and
independent “legally aided” sector was a by-product of the expansion of funding
and scope.
2.3 It had been, and
remains, a major component of this system that the supplier base provides its
own capital in order to set up organisations, provide premises and employ
people. In this sense it is a free
market where entrepreneurs have invested their own capital identifying gaps in
the market and establishing businesses.
2.4 There were parallel
changes in the private solicitor marketplace as conveyancing lost its fixed fee
structures and in the more successful private client firms partners often became
dissatisfied with low hourly rates of return in legal aid work and began
shedding that work, a process accelerated from the 1990s as Legal Aid rates
became frozen and eroded by inflation.
Lord MacKay decided to abolish his Legal Aid Advisory Committee. The current panel constituted to assist in
the review of criminal Legal Aid is a distant echo of that forerunner.
3. The Rise of Contracting
3.1 The Legal Aid Board
brought forward the idea that suppliers would be contracted to supply Legal Aid
services coupled to the idea of a quality mark.
This had some basis in academic research (see the book, Standing Accused
by McConville and Others which lamented poor standards in criminal work).
3.2 Other major structural
developments were the establishing of the Crown Prosecution Service following
major public scandals involving forced confessions by police officers and also
the technological development of tape recording which allowed a new mode for conducting
interviews. The 1984 Police and Criminal
Evidence Act also introduced the idea of the delivery of rights by independent
Custody Officers whilst extending police powers. One particularly significant development was
the decision to allow the police 24 hours in which to detain a person before
charge. This was fiercely debated with
12 hours as a viable alternative but this was rejected and 24 hours underpins
the subsequent development of a lackadaisical approach to the investigation
whilst the person is in custody. Providing access to legal advice in the Police
Station was a major costs driver.
3.3 Initially contracting
was to be voluntary and was expressly said not to be a policy which would
become compulsory. Of course it did and
very unfortunately contracting become a major dividing factor, there being
separate crime and civil contracts. This
rupture of services had profound consequences on the market causing firms to
choose between spheres and although many continue to operate both there was
also a large bureaucratic burden. That
burden was another factor in private client firms continuing to abandon Legal
Aid services.
4. A Rich Ecology
4.1 What the entrepreneurial
activity had created, in the context of the expansion of Legal Aid to meet need,
was a rich fabric of firms and services.
We have sometimes likened this to the ecology of a rainforest, diverse,
valuable and especially establishing in local communities a variety of client
choice and a feeling amongst clients, usually poorer and working class, that
they had access to justice through “their” solicitor.
5. Reform and the Market
5.1 The foundation of reform
was a myth, that Legal Aid expenditure was “out of control” accompanied by a
sinister subtext that the forces driving expenditure were the supplier base
improperly exploiting Legal Aid.
Academic research showed that the driving factor was in fact the rise in
need and volume of cases and a tsunami of legislation, especially in crime. Nevertheless this myth took hold.
5.2 The Paradox in the early
2000s was that the government was substantially investing in workers
compensation schemes and rightly so, but whilst it spent billions on the one
hand in those schemes it sought to cut Legal Aid expenditure by millions on the
other.
5.3 Lord Carter proposed a
crude simplistic trade off of volume for price a theme that has bedevilled so
called “reform” ever since and dominated proposals for change.
5.4 The proposals that came
forward were administratively complex and essentially foundered as they were
unable to resolve contradictions between rewarding incumbent suppliers with
market share and providing opportunities for new entrants, whilst also
hopelessly confusing the nature of the market with other markets where there
are multiple opportunities for suppliers to bid for work.
5.5 This is worth spelling
out. The Ministry of Justice is a single
purchaser of Legal Aid services. It sets
prices. The suppliers when they bid for
work (however defined) face an existential crisis. If their bid fails then they are out of
business. There is no alternative place
for them to bid.
5.6 In other words this
Legal Aid market for services is not like, for example, the NHS, which procures
across a vast organisation for multiple services offering bidders the
opportunities to bid for difference sizes of contract in different geographical
areas in circumstances where, therefore, the failure of a bid is not terminal
to their business.
5.7 It was an historic
strength of the system that it was open. In other words there were no limits on
the number of contractors and sufficient prices allowed a degree of
entrepreneurial activity to fill in gaps in the market place. As prices have
declined so has that activity. However
there are two other benefits from the way in which this market has operated.
5.8 A key element to
successful entrepreneurial activity has been establishing reputation and this
has been driven by the other key element of client choice. The introduction of the Duty Solicitor
Schemes enabled firms to source a more “captive” work stream and gain clients
through duty solicitor activity in courts and police stations. Nevertheless it
still remained and remains an important element for all firms that the quality
of what they do is sufficient to draw that client back to them or achieve word
of mouth referrals. In this way client choice drives quality.
5.9 Unfortunately
restrictions on the ability to transfer Representation Orders have led to a
decline in consumer/client choice. There
is a consumer paradox for people who are initially arrested, represented by a
duty solicitor and bailed or released under investigation. At that stage, pre-charge, there is no Legal
Aid available and they are actually free to make enquiries in the marketplace
to find out if the solicitor they have accessed accidentally as the duty
solicitor is the person best placed to represent them or whether they could
find an alternative with better reputation. In this way consumers are free to
move around within the market.
5.10 However, if for example, a
person is arrested for murder, has a duty solicitor and is remanded
in custody they then find it very difficult to change due to the rules
which to this degree undermine an aspect of client choice.
5.11 Contracting has also
restricted the market by restricting the opportunities for new entrants to the
start of each contract cycle as well as being a system which has severed civil
and criminal services. The most startling reform that could be contemplated
would be ending contracting completely.
This would be a return to a pre-contracting era where all firms needed
to do was to keep within the rules in respect of claims and payments. In other words that the work was properly
done and claimed. Such a more open
system would certainly allow new entrants and with other incentives and
structural changes, allow firms to re-establish mixed practices of civil
and crime and provide more local integrated services needed to meet the vast
unmet need.
5.12 It is not difficult to be
imaginative about what is possible in the Legal Aid market. The Legal Services Commission as the
successor to the Legal Aid Board had a worthwhile initiative through which
firms took on trainees who were subsidised directly by the LSC in return for a
contractual commitment to stay in Legal Aid work for a period of time.
5.13 Legal Aid as a bespoke
subject ought to be an option within law school courses and participation can
be leveraged through grant, the relief of debt and payments to suppliers to
provide subsequent training contracts.
6. A Fundamental Problem
6.1 Underpinning access to
justice are the rights to a fair trial and equality of arms between the
parties. Crucial is the adversarial
system working properly to ensure that the court has before it all admissible
evidence in order that the fundamental objective, which is the pursuit of
truth, is achieved.
6.2 No one is facing up to
the work, time and costs issues posed by the explosion of electronic
material. It simply means that in cases
where it is relevant (and there is often a contest about what is and what is
not properly served as evidence or unused material) the evidence has got be
examined and deployed by prosecution and defence. These are tasks which have made the process
of litigation more time intensive and more costly. This is for the police as investigators, the
prosecution as an independent prosecutorial body assessing the evidence and for
the defendants. All require extra resources in the long term in a degree of
magnitude to properly cope with the technological development. There is no shortcut and it simply requires
more money and acceptance that this will be a demand led system that cannot be
contained with fixed “envelopes” of cost.
7. The Erosion of Value
7.1 The above argument in
relation to the explosion of electronic material forms a context for the major
other issue which has been the erosion of value. It is not possible for solicitors and counsel
to continue negotiating around the same envelope of money being deployed for
cases in new ways. Inventing other
proxies for value or combining proxies with time or combining other structures
of payment such as standard fees, non-standard fees, higher-standard fees still
has to account for both the explosion in evidence and the fact that current
values have been eroded to a degree where the work is unsustainable.
7.2 That unsustainability is
evidenced by the recruitment and retention crisis within solicitors firms
conducting criminal work. It is also
evidenced by the almost complete separation of private client work and Legal
Aid work within the solicitor’s profession and by the advancing age of the
cohort of duty solicitors.
7.3 Research might also
reveal a very similar pattern in relation to the ages of partners or directors
of firms within the supplier base which is also similarly advancing. Career
opportunities have been truncated by the short horizon of business, the
uncertainty of profits and the lack of career paths.
7.4 One way of exiting is to
the Crown Prosecution Service which now offers substantially better terms than
are available generally within the defence community. Another way of exiting is to simply abandon
the work and take up different careers. For students with vast debt Legal Aid
is deeply unattractive.
8. Access to Justice
8.1 It was a by-product of
the expansion of Legal Aid and the availability of firms within communities
providing a range of legally aided services that many millions of people could
buy into the idea that there was a degree of access to justice.
8.2 Much is written about alienation,
voices not being heard, and the unrepresentative nature of politics, inequality
and the socially excluded. Legal Aid cuts, in particular LASPO, have formed a backdrop
which has accentuated exclusion.
8.3 Exclusion also has
direct economic consequences. A family
with less income because they are unable to challenge welfare benefit decisions
live in greater poverty. Children in
greater poverty are more likely to fail
in the education system, often being excluded, more vulnerable to drift into
gangs, crime and county lines drug dealing.
Similarly challenging are living in conditions of disrepair, losing
housing and the gross disruption of family life where there are cycles of
imprisonment, alcohol and drug abuse and devastating adverse immigration
decisions and deportation. Many live and
are brought up in deeply hostile environments and too often the inability of
fathers to access contact and maintain parenting has potentially disastrous
consequences.
8.4 Add to these other
factors such as loss of youth clubs, social workers, and the pressure of
schools to exclude pupils. It is no
wonder that the world of gang affiliation with its sense of identity and drug
dealing giving access to otherwise unattainable riches is such a lure to young
people and indeed older people involved in organised crime.
8.5 The extent of organised
crime has been highlighted by the National Crime Agency in its bid for between
£2-3billion to combat what it describes as a major threat to security and
wellbeing. Will that funding and these
initiatives drive more cases into the Criminal Justice System? The idea that more cases will arise which
demand more resources stands in stark contrast to falling volume as a result of
the debacle of the RUI stance adopted by many police forces in relation to the
many thousands of people arrested.
8.6 What all of this means, including
the review itself, is an extremely unstable environment for Legal Aid
practitioners. Low margins make firms highly vulnerable to changes in case volume
and case mix. A two year “review” is
irrelevant to the immediate crisis. What is required is at least a short term
injection of funds, the making good of the last 8.75% cut which was predicated
on the manipulation of the supplier base producing fewer suppliers with higher
volumes, which never took place, and which was in itself arbitrary and
unfair. What is also needed however are not
only higher levels of remuneration, but an imaginative reworking of incentives
and structure to support an independent legal profession and a degree of
stability which would allow businesses to flourish whilst meeting need.
9. London and its Hinterland
9.1 At over 650 square miles
with the largest concentration of population in the country London poses
particular problems for Legal Aid lawyers.
9.1 It is an area of higher
cost. Those costs relate to the costs of business premises, higher wages and
higher costs for employees for accommodation and travel. In a recent Reed Business Support Salary
Guide for 2019 an Office Manager in London is said to command a wage of
£40,100. In the East Midlands the figure
£23,700 and the North East £29,200 and the North West £23,900. In the South West and Wales the figure falls
to £22,300.
9.3 Traditionally the
particular costs base of London were recognised by additional London Weighting
supplements on hourly rates. There is a
powerful case for the reintroduction of London Weighting within any newly
devised scheme.
9.4 Another myth is that
there was an oversupply of firms in London.
This is not true and the number of firms is proportionate to the
population. This was established in
passing by the KPMG report in the failed debacle of tendering Duty Solicitor
Schemes.
9.5 London is the centre of
political protest and government and inevitably public protest type crime tends
to arise more often and so does financial crime attached to London being the
centre of financial services.
9.6 A fundamental problems
for practitioners has been the complete absence of planning. There is no court near a police station which
is near a prison, they are spread haphazardly.
The system has developed without the slightest regard for efficiencies
that might arise from locating services together. Indeed plans to relocate remand prisoners
only in Wandsworth, Belmarsh and Highdown, which is actually outside London in
Sutton, would only exacerbate the problems.
9.7 Very large distances
must now be traversed across London for defendants, ‘victims’ and witnesses and
indeed all the participants in the court process.
9.8 The idea has been
advanced frequently by the LCCSA for over a decade that there ought to be
reform of the Duty Solicitor Scheme. At
present solicitors join two court schemes plus associated youth court
schemes but are allocated to as many as eight or nine 24 hour police station
schemes depending on the location of their office. This thins volume in any particular
court. Bringing the schemes into line so
that solicitors are allocated two or three police stations schemes most contiguous
to their office and the court schemes ought to produce a greater volume of work
for firms in their local courts.
9.9 Incidentally scheme
inflation, by which many more people joined each individual scheme, was a
product of a policy decision by the LSC to automatically allocate all
qualifying solicitors, depending on the whereabouts of their office to every
scheme that was available.
10. Opportunity or Threat? The Criminal Legal Aid Fee Review
10.1 The immediate impulse for
the review was the promise to the Bar to review the AGFS arrangements. That promise was then conflated with the
existing idea of a review of the LGFS (no doubt more urgent from the perspective
of the MOJ after the successful JR of their plan to cut £30M or so from the
LGFS Scheme) and then in turn extended to encompass all fee schemes, police
stations, magistrates’ courts and the VHCC scheme.
10.2 Three elements dominate legal
aid fees for the last twenty five years.
The erosion of fee structures by inflation. The endless cuts to EVERY fee scheme. The hugely
bureaucratic, unmanageable and failed ‘reform’ proposals encompassing Best
Value Tendering, Price Competitive Tendering and 2 tier contracting of duty
solicitors schemes and other similar debacles including VHCC and family
contracts. The 2 Tier debacle was accompanied by a completely arbitrary 17.5%
cut in fees. What is extraordinary is
the sheer scale of that cut; 17.5%, not 1.5 or 2% but this huge figure. Subsequently 8.75% was restored after the
failure of the scheme, still leaving practitioners with a completely arbitrary
8.75% cut.
10.3 The common theme has been
an approach to Legal Aid as a ‘market’ (fundamentally misunderstood, see para
5.) to be manipulated with the sole objective of driving down price (cuts)
encouraged by overtures from a handful of ‘larger’ suppliers who sought greater
volume and market share. In civil the
hatchet of LASPO simply removed access to justice for millions of people and
further disrupted and eroded the supplier base. .
10.4 What has been absent is
any coherent view of Legal Aid based on principles of fair trial, equality of
arms or access to justice through increasing the resource that enables people
to believe they have the means (legally aided lawyers) to pursue their rights,
that their stake in society and belief in its fairness, in the application of
the rule of law to them, has meaning because they can rebalance the unfair
advantage of ‘others’ who have the power (landlords, Councils, the DWP,
insurance companies, the Home Office, Police) by instructing ‘their’ lawyer.
This is the real context of rearranging fee structures; it is not an end in
itself but only one component of policy that ought to have this enabling
outcome. This Review perpetuates the division of crime and civil being confined
to criminal Legal Aid fees when the reality is that legal aid services are
accessed across lifetimes in multiple ways as need overlaps the civil and
criminal boundaries.
10.5 That vision is entirely
absent from this Review which is framed as the ‘right time to think more widely
about the future of criminal legal aid schemes’, without any commitment to any
funding increase, only to the ‘right level’ of legal aid provision. It is most likely
to be a missed opportunity and actually another ‘cut’. The ravaging of value by inflation will not be
addressed by a permanent compensatory mechanism, and any ‘ambitious’ attempt to manipulate the market will yet
again misread its reality and lead to JR and debacle. Is this to be a moment (actually a year or
two with continuing ministerial reshuffles) for reinvigorating access to
justice (restoring the £1 billion about 1/800th of government expenditure)
or another episode in the erosion of Legal Aid and its supplier base?
10.6 In the period 2004/2005 to
2019 Government Expenditure rose from around £400 billion to over £800 billion. In that period removing £1 billion from Legal
Aid was a political choice. The
courageous and correct political choice would be to restore access to justice
by expanding the Legal Aid spend by £1 billion.
10.7 The complete absence of a
commitment to restore funding levels and the absence of vision are
depressing. There is little to indicate
that the trajectory of the history of Legal Aid will change. Rather that the reality that will emerge will
remain one of cuts, loss of services and more people who believe that justice
is not to be found within the society in which they live.
Greg Powell
LCCSA
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